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Article
Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and
the Great Corporate Giveaway
Charity has no business to sit at boards of directors
qud charity.* -- Lord Bowen
E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, corporations gave five billion dollars to charitable
organizations.' This represented an increase of 4.2 percent over the
previous year, although after adjusting for inflation, corporate
giving actually was down 0.5 percent. Corporations simply gave
away five billion dollars in profits in a single year. The obvious
question is: How can corporations, through their managers and
directors, justify giving away five billion dollars in shareholders'
profits?
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a deduction
for certain charitable contributions made by corporations but
section 170 certainly does not authorize managers or directors to
make such contributions. Authorization to make charitable
* Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch.D. 654, 673 (1883).
** Professor and Chairperson, Department of General Business-Business Law, Michigan State
University; B.A. (1967), M.A. (1968), J.D. (1972), LL.M. (1977) The University of Texas at Austin.
1. McMillen, Americans Gave More to Charity Again in 1989; Total Topped $100-Billion
for 2nd Straight Year, Chronicle of Higher Education, June 13, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
contributions is contained in the corporation statutes of all states
and the District of Columbia.' These statutes are based on a theory
of corporate social responsibility. In 1969, Professor J. A. C.
Hetherington stated that "this one aspect [corporate charitable
giving] of corporate good citizenship seems therefore to be legally
settled." 3 However, this area is legally settled only in the sense
that these statutes have been enacted and are in effect. This area is
not settled philosophically or economically. In the absence of a
section 170 deduction, these statutory authorizations would become
meaningless. Given the state of the federal budget and the now
expressed need to raise taxes, we can not afford to continue to let
as much as $1.7 billion dollars annually leak out of the federal
treasury through the section 170 corporate charitable deduction.'
2. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-20(13) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.010(13) (1989); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-004(13) (1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-25-103 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE §
207(e) (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(m) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
291(d) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-304(13) (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.011(2)(k) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-302(13) (1990); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 415-4(13) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-4(m) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, pam. 3.10(m)
(Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2(13) (West 1989); IOWA CODE § 490.302(13) (West
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(9) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271.A-020(13) (Baldwin
1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:41(B)(12) (West 1969); MD. CORPS & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-
103(13) (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 155, § 12C (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.1261(k) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.161, subd. 11 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 79-1-3 (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(15) (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-108(13)
(1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(13) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(6) (1989); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:4 (1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
53-11-4(M) (Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (MeKinney 1986); N.C. GEM. STAT.
§ 55-3-02(a)(13) (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.13(D) (Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(9) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §
60.077(n) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1502(9) (Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4(13)
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-102(13) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-
58(13) (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13-102(13) (1988); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.02A(14) (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(m) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
1852(13) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(12) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.03.020(o)
(1990); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-8(m) (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(12) (West 1957); WYO. STAT.
§ 17-16-302(a)(xiii) (1990).
3. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 279 (1969).
4. $5 billion times the top corporate tax rate of 34% is $1.7 billion. It is not possible to say
exactly how much would be saved as a result of repeal of the section 170 charitable deduction for
corporations because certain current charitable deductions might otherwise qualify as deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. See I.R.C. § 162 (West 1990).
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This Article analyzes corporate charitable giving and the
section 170 corporate deduction from economic, moral, and legal
perspectives. In economic terms, this Article considers profit
maximization, the principal-agent problem, and the tax effect on
corporate giving. From a moral standpoint, this Article discusses
the issues of corporate social responsibility and moral agency.
Next, this Article examines the laws of agency, trusts, and
corporations as applied to corporate giving. Based on the foregoing
analysis, this Article recommends that Congress repeal the section
170 corporate deduction provision and require corporations to
justify all expenditures in terms of profit maximization and
business purpose.
IX. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-section 170 Amendment
Before Congress amended the predecessor section to section
170 to allow corporations a charitable contribution deduction,
courts limited charitable contributions to those gifts which the
directors reasonably thought would financially benefit the
corporation. In Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co.,' the
court permitted charitable contributions to the University of Buffalo
and Canisius College where there was a reasonable probability of
direct benefit to the corporation and there was no objection by
shareholders or creditors.6 If a shareholder or creditor objected, the
result may have been different. The directors regarded the
contributions as proper incidental business expenses.7 The
corporation benefitted by having the future ability to secure
employees trained and skilled in corporate business and industrial
affairs from these colleges as well as the benefits from advertising
the gifts, although the court noted that the advantage derived was
5. 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
6. Xa at 58.
7. IcL
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tantamount to a personal benefit.' Certain gifts such as those to
assist in the erection of a theater building, to assist in paying
expenses of a festival or fair, and to assist in a political campaign,
the court deemed ultra vires.9
In many of the early cases addressing corporate contributions,
the courts understandably focused on whether the expenses were
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or
business." In Corning Glass Works v. Lucas," the court held that
a $25,000 contribution to a hospital building fund was an ordinary
and necessary business expense. 2 The court reasoned that by
contributing to the hospital building fund the corporation would not
have to expand its dispensary. 3 The court pointed out that
individuals could give away their money and property, but
corporate directors could not do so unless the donation was
reasonably calculated to further the corporation's general business
interest.' It appears from Armstrong Cork Co. and Corning Glass
Works that directors, within limits, could give corporate assets in
support of charities important to the welfare of the community in
which the corporation operated."5 This view was the forerunner of
the theory of social responsibility of corporations. 6
B. Section 170
The charitable contribution deduction for contributions made
to religious, educational, and other charitable organizations was
enacted in 1917 7 and, hence, has a history nearly as long as
federal income tax itself. Initially, only individuals were allowed
8. Id. at 59. See infra text accompanying notes 44-59.
9. Armstrong Cork Co., 285 F. at 59.
10. See I.R.C. § 162 (West 1990) (current codification of the ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction).
11. 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
12. Ic at 801.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 800.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 5-16 (discussing Armstrong Cork Co. and Corning
Glass Works).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 93-119 (discussing the social responsibility theory).
17. Act of October 3, 1917, ch. 63, tit. XII, § 1201(2) (40 Stat. 330) (1917).
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a charitable contribution deduction. 8  Corporate charitable
contributions became deductible under section 23(q) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939."M Today, section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, within limits, allows a deduction for
charitable contributions for both individuals and corporations." A
charitable contribution is a contribution or gift to or for the use of--
1. A State, a possession of the United States, or any political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United States or District of
Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is made for exclusively
public purposes.
2. A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation --
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession
thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District
of Columbia, or any possession of the United States; (3) organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals; (C) no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and (D)
which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by
reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.
3. A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or
society of, or trust or foundation for, any such post or organization --
(A) organized in the United States or any of its possessions, and (B)
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual.
4. In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic
fraternal society, order, or association, operating under the lodge
system, but only if such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
5. A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the
benefit of its members, or any corporation chartered solely for burial
18. Xd.
19. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 15-16 (1939).
20. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1990).
225
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purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter to
engage in any business not necessarily incident to that purpose, if such
company or corporation is not operated for profit and no part of the
net earnings of such company or corporation inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual.
21
Other tax exempt organizations do not qualify to receive deductible
charitable contributions. A contribution or gift to an individual,
regardless of how needy or charitable the purpose, is not
deductible.' A contribution to a foreign charitable organization is
not deductible;' yet, United States-based charitable organizations
may use charitable contributions abroad, except for contributions
by corporations to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation, which must
be used within the United States or its possessions.24 However, a
domestic charitable organization may not act as a mere conduit for
transferring contributions to a foreign organization.'
The Code imposes limitations on the amount deductible by
individuals, based on the type of property contributed, how the
donee uses the contributed property, and what kind of charitable
organization receives the contribution. 6  The Code limits
corporations to a maximum deduction equal to ten percent of
taxable income computed without regard to charitable deductions,
most special deductions for corporations,27  net operating
carrybacks,"8 or capital loss carrybacks.2'
The growing importance of the charitable contribution
deduction can be seen by comparing amounts donated over a period
of years. Charitable giving in 1970 amounted to $21 billion, with
21. Id. § 170(c) (West 1990).
22. See id § 170 (West 1990) (stating what is deductible as a contribution).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101.
26. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West 1990) (describing particular restrictions).
27. See id §§241-47,249-50 (West 1990) (special deductions for corporations exempted from
section 170).
28. See id. § 172 (West 1990) (defining net operating carrybacks).
29. Id § 170(b)(2) (West 1990). See id. § 1212(a)(1) (West 1990) (listing capital loss
carrybacks).
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$797 million donated by corporations?' This amount more than
doubled to $49 billion in 1980, with $2.4 billion given by
corporations." As the amount of charitable contributions deducted
nearly doubled in 1985, so did charitable giving over its 1980
figure to $79.8 billion, with $4.3 billion by corporations.32 Reports
of charitable giving in 1989 indicate that of the record amount of
$114.7 billion donated, corporations donated $5 billion.33 Nearly
one half of all charitable giving ($37.7 billion in 1985) goes to
religious organizations, while educational organizations, hospitals,
health organizations, and social welfare organizations combined
accounted for approximately thirty-eight percent of the total ($31
billion in 1985). 34 Forty-two percent of corporate giving goes to
education while human services, public/society benefit, arts,
culture, and humanities, health, religion, and miscellaneous account
for the rest of corporate giving.33 Charitable giving consistently
amounts to approximately two percent of gross national product.'
These statistics reflect the altruism and generosity of the
American people. Corporations, however, do not give based on
altruism or generosity but on tax consequences. The economic
literature shows that the corporate tax has a price and net-income
30. A l wERcAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING U.S.A.: ESTIMATES OF
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING IN 1985 AND THE TRENDS THEY SHOW 33, 41 (1986) [hereinafter 1985
GIVING REPORT].
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6. Individuals deducted $25.8 billion in 1980 and $50 billion in 1985. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1980: INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS 57 (1982) and
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1985: INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS 62 (1988).
33. McMillen, Americans Gave More to Charity Again in 1989; Total Topped $100-Billion
for 2nd Straight Year, The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 13, 1990, at AI, col. 3; id. A23, col.
1.
34. 1985 GIVING REPORT, supra note 30, at 7.
35. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING U.S.A.: ESTIMATES OF
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING IN 1987 AND THE TRENDS THEY SHOW 65 (1988). The exact percentages
of noneducational corporate giving in 1987 were: Human services, 23.6%; public/society benefit,
13.2%; arts, culture, and humanities, 11.9%; health, 4.4%; religion, .03%; and miscellaneous, 3.97%.
i
36. 1985 GIVING REPORT, supra note 30, at 41.
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effect on corporate giving.' Corporate charitable contributions are
proportional to after-tax income.'
Corporations are treated more favorably under the Code than
individuals. Unlike individuals, corporations do not have a standard
deduction, therefore, every dollar of charitable contributions is
deductible up to the statutory limit. 9 Moreover, the problem of
equity between individual taxpayers who itemize and those who do
not does not arise in the corporate context, since all corporations,
in effect, itemize. Given the magnitude of the amounts involved
and the relationship between the profit motive and corporate giving,
an examination of that relationship follows.
III. ANALYSIS
Congress based the section 170 deduction on a public welfare
theory.' The public welfare theory is that charitable organizations
perform services that the government would otherwise have to
provide in their absence. ' Therefore, any loss of revenue resulting
is more than offset by shifting the financial burden for providing
those services from the federal treasury to charitable
organizations. 2 Thus, Congress encourages the private sector to
actively engage in activities regarded as "fundamental" or
"socially desirable" to thereby promote the general welfare.43
Corporate contributions aid the advancement of education and
science, provide relief for the poor, distressed, and underprivileged,
advance religion, erect and maintain public buildings, monuments,
and works, lessen the burden of government, and promote the
social welfare. Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons why
Congress should not permit corporations to take a section 170
37. See C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 275 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Monograph, 1985) (detailing a good, although technical, economic
analysis of the price and income effects).
38. Id.
39. See I.R.C. § 170 (b)(2) (West 1990).
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charitable contribution deduction. One of these compelling reasons
is profit maximization which is generally assumed to be the driving
force behind corporate decisions.
A. Profit Maximization and the Principal-Agent Problem
1. Profit Maximization Theory
In microeconomics, it is a tenet of the theory of the firm that
firms are profit maximizers." Profit maximization is justified on
the grounds that if competitive firms did not maximize profits they
would be inefficient and hence would be forced out of business by
the efficient firms. 5 Monopolists are presumed to be profit
maximizers by virtue of their position.' Moreover, if the
shareholders of a corporation were able to directly run the
corporation they would opt for profit maximization and its
corresponding cost minimization. Of course, the shareholders may
not prefer profit maximization if they are risk-averse or have a
vested interest in the price of one of the firm's products as a result
of consumption of the firm's goods. Empirically, the evidence for
this view is weak since most shareholders diversify their portfolios
to reduce market risks, and shareholders consume a relatively small
amount of the firm's goods. Pragmatically, economists prefer the
profit maximizing theory of a unitary firm because it presents a
mathematically clean, solvable minimax problem. However, there
is a growing body of economic research on the principal-agent
problem which hypothesizes that firms are not necessarily profit
maximizers.47
44. H. VARIAN, MICROECONoMic ANALYSIS 6 (2d ed. 1984).
45. Id.
46. Id
47. See, e.g., K. Arrow, The Economics ofAgency, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE
OF BUSINESS (J. Pratt and R. Zeehhauser eds. 1985); D. Baron, Design of Regulatory Mechanisms
and Institutions, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee and R. Willig eds.
1986); D. Sappington and J. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND POuICIES (E. Bailey ed. 1987) (analyzing the economics of the
principal agent problem).
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2. Principal-Agent Theory
The non-profit maximization theory in the economic literature
is largely associated with corporations where ownership is
separated from control. 8 Corporations are owned by shareholders
who do not run them, and run by managers who do not own
them.49 Not only is there a separation between ownership and
control, there is a loss of control by the board of directors."0 The
horizontal expansion of corporations accounts for the loss of
supervisory control. The expansion shifts the role of auditing and
allocating resources among competing divisions from the boards of
directors to the lower levels of management. Those in control of
the corporation are supposed to act in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders; however, corporate managers may
have objectives other than profit maximization, such as maximizing
firm or department growth, maximizing sales volume, reducing
effort by increasing the number of managerial personnel, obtaining
managerial perquisites such as a large office, executive bathroom,
company car, first class accommodations, personal satisfaction or
career development, or directing money or property to charitable
institutions of their choice. Under the principal-agent theory, inside
information allows managers this discretion.' Managers have
inside information not otherwise available to the shareholders. The
shift from large numbers of widely dispersed shareholders to
institutional shareholders does not seem to have altered the
48. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKEr STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 32-33,
(2d ed. 1980) (discussing the separation of ownership and control and its effects).
49. Ownership of a small percentage ofthe corporation's stock by managers does not undercut
the analysis, because managers still control property they do not own: the percentage of the
corporation owned by shareholders other than management.
50. See, e.g., A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE (1966) (discussing the function of
board of directors in modem corporation).
51. See, e.g., K. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (J. Pratt and R. Zechhauser eds. 1985); D. Baron, Design of Regulatory
Mechanisms and Institutions in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee and R.
Willig eds. 1986); D. Sappington and J. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation in PUBLIC REGULATION:
NEw PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITrunONS AND POLICIES (E. Bailey ed. 1987) (economic analysis of the
principal agent problem).
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asymmetric information condition. " With incomplete information,
shareholders cannot accurately monitor managers' performances.
This has tremendous ramifications for the stock market. Common
stock evaluation is based on discounting net income streams and
analyzing profit centers. 3 Discounting a submaximum profit
stream distorts the value of the firm and its stock price.' Without
adequate knowledge concerning the corporation's technology
development, for example, the shareholders and investors have no
way vof knowing whether an expansion of the research and
development division is justified by the firm's technology or
whether it represents empire building such as inflated need for
more personnel, high priced toys, or ego of the division director.
Without more information, the shareholder or investor cannot
determine whether to invest, disinvest, or maintain his or her stock
interest if the managers are not profit maximizers. Managerial
objectives could involve prestige, ego, power, number of
subordinates, size of budget, conviviality, friendship, career
development, and other non-profit maximizing behavior such as
charitable contributions to the manager's favorite charity or alma
mater. The corporation reduces shareholder profits by the amount
that management siphons off corporate profits for these purposes.
Charitable contributions that would not otherwise be deductible are
not consistent with profit maximization.
3. Tax Effects
The econometric literature suggests that the corporate tax has
both a price and net-income effect on corporate giving, which is
consistent with non-profit maximization models.55 The "price" or
cost of giving for an itemizer, individual or corporate, is (1-MTR)
X $1, or simply $(1-MTR). MTR is the taxpayer's marginal tax
52. See E. RAsMusEN, GAMEs AND INFORMATION 133-79 (1989) (theoretical discussion of
the asymmetric information problem).
53. See HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALs OF MoDEiRN BusINEss § 11.10 (1989) (discussing
valuation of stock).
54. See id.
55. C. CLOTF LTER, supra note 37, at 275.
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rate. The net-income effect means that in years of high profits,
firms make or increase charitable contributions, while in lean years
firms cutback or eliminate contributions.
The loss of profits to the shareholders can be somewhat
ameliorated by the tax law which may allow the corporation a
deduction under section 162 or 170.6 If a deduction is allowed,
the marginal cost to the shareholders of one dollar donated to a
charitable organization is one minus the corporation's marginal tax
rate. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the corporate tax schedule
contains higher rates than for individuals." In this respect
shareholders benefit from corporate charitable contributions if the
contributions are substitutes for individual giving, which may be
the case for closely held corporations, but is highly unlikely for
publicly held corporations except for a few controlling persons.
With only these few exceptions, firms reduce shareholder profits
with no corresponding benefit when managers exercise their
discretion by giving money or property to charitable organizations.
4. Remedy
The question then becomes: Whose charity is it anyway? The
situation is even more vexing if the shareholder would not
otherwise contribute to or support the particular charitable
organization. The power or ability to make charitable contributions
is a perquisite of management under a principal-agent analysis and
should constitute part of the manager's compensation. Perhaps the
amount of the charitable contribution should be included in the
manager's compensation, the deductibility of which by the
corporation will be subsequently judged under the "ordinary and
56. See I.R.C. §§ 162 (West 1990) (allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business
expenses); 170 (providing deductions for charitable contributions)
57. The top marginal tax rate for individuals is 28 percent although there is a five percent
surtax, increasing the top rate to 33 percent for certain income brackets through taxable year 1990
and 31 percent after taxable year 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). The top
corporate tax rate is 34 percent for taxable income in excess of $75,000; however, there is a five
percent surtax on corporate taxable income in excess of $100,000 up to a maximum additional tax
of $11,750. See I.R.C. § 1 l(b)(1) (West 1990) (codification of tax brackets).
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necessary" rule of section 162."' The manager would then be
entitled to a section 170 deduction within the statutory
limitations. 9 The corporation would not be entitled to a section
170 deduction.
B. Law of Agency
Not only does the economic theory of principal-agent
undermine the case for corporate giving, the legal relationship
between principal and agent undermines the case as well. A
corporation can only act through agents.' Since a corporation can
only act through agents, it must necessarily have the capacity to
appoint them; however, its status as principal confers no
consciousness or individual being." In general, the officers and
employees of a corporation are its agents.'
The board of directors situation is rather unique. Although
shareholders elect and can remove directors, the directors are not
agents of the shareholders, and they are not principals.
' The
corporation's agents owe their allegiance to the corporation, not the
directors.6 ' The directors are not agents of the corporation because
of their statutory powers of management; they are not subject to
control by anyone, which is a requirement of the principal-agent
relationship.' Since the development of the multidivisional form,
boards of directors have lost much of the control given to them by
the state corporation acts. ' Directors of publicly held corporations
generally delegate their authority to manage to the officers and
58. See id I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1990); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7,1.162-8, & 1.162-9 (1990)
(detailing limitations on deductions for compensation).
59. See I.R.C. § 170 (West 1990) (allowing charitable contribution deductions).
60. W. SELL, AGENCY 13 (1975).
61. Id.
62. See HENN & ALEXANDER, CORPORATIONS 586,593-94 (3rd ed. 1983) (discussing officers
as agents of corporations).
63. Id at 562-63.
64. Id. at 586-606 (discussing the duties of officers as agents of the corporation).
65. Id at 611 (outlining the roles of the officers and directors in a corporation).
66. Id at 593.
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content themselves with ratifying the officers' actions. The concern
here, then, is with the officers as agents of the corporation.
An agent who receives money or property from the principal
for the benefit of the principal is under a duty to account for that
money or property.' Generally, an agent must attempt to earn a
profit for the principal, and, hence, the agent is under a duty to
account for any such profits earned.' An agent has a duty not to
act adversely to the interests of the principal, an example of which
is appropriating the principal's assets for the agent's benefit or
giving away the principal's assets. One such set of transactions
consists of an agent dealing with a close friend or relative where,
in effect, the transaction is for the benefit of the agent.' This is
similar to the charitable contribution case where the officer
authorizes and makes corporate charitable contributions to his or
her favorite charities or alma mater. In such cases of adverse action
the principal has the right of rescission." This is true even if the
principal suffered no harm or gained from the transaction.7 The
agent essentially is acting in his or her own behalf, thereby
violating the duty of loyalty. An agent who converts the principal's
money or property is liable to the principal for the full amount of
the property or money converted.72
Of course, the officer is an agent of the corporation, not an
agent of the shareholders, so that the rights of rescission and
restitution belong to the corporation and not the shareholders."
The corporate principal, being controlled by the very persons who
are violating their duties owed to the corporation, may not proceed
67. See, e.g., Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 179 N.W.2d 836, 840 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Stuber v. Taylor, 200 N.W.2d 276, 280 (N.D. 1972); Scars, Roebuck & Co. v.
Kelly, I Misc. 2d 624, 149 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (1956).
69. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Bradley, 281 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Mo. 1955).
70. See, e.g., Donovan & Schuenke v. Sampsell, 226 F.2d 804, 812 (9th Cir. 1955).
71. See, e.g., Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123,94 N.W.2d 273,281 (1959).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 402 (1957).
73. See text accompanying notes 60-76 (discussing the role of the officer as an agent of the
corporation).
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against the agents.74 At this point, the shareholders do have a
remedy--the shareholder derivative suit.75
If an officer makes a corporate charitable contribution to his or
her favorite charity or alma mater and the corporation acting
through its board of directors refuses to seek rescission or
restitution, a shareholder should bring a derivative suit in behalf of
the corporation to recover the amount dispersed. Of the two
remedies--rescission and restitution--from a public policy
viewpoint, restitution is preferred so that charitable organizations
can depend on contributions made and received. If restitution is
ordered, the officer pays back the corporation and should be
allowed the individual section 170 deduction to the extent
allowable. The corporation, having recovered the sum, is not
entitled to a section 170 deduction.76 In the event that the officer
is unable to make full restitution, the individual section 170
deduction should be limited to the amount repaid within each
taxable year. The corporation should be entitled to deduct a section
165 loss for amounts unrecoverable but no section 170 deduction.
C. Fiduciary Duties and the Business Judgment Rule
The law of agency deals with the relationship between
principal and agent, but since directors are neither principals nor
agents, new law had to be created or old law modified to deal with
the relationship between director and corporation. Based on their
analysis of a series of early corporation cases, Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means contend that:
[A]Il powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their
interest appears. The use of the power is subject to equitable limitation
when the power has been exercised to the detriment of their interest,
74. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62, at 1037.
75. See U at 1035-40 (discussing the shareholder derivative cause of action).
76. See I.R.C. § 165 (West 1990) (discussing the amounts unrecoverable deduction).
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however absolute the grant of power may be in terms, and however
correct the technical exercise of it may have been.... And that, in
every case, corporate action must be twice tested: [F]irst by the
technical rules having to do with the existence and proper exercise of
the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those
which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee's exercise of
wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a
fiduciary. 77
In effect, Berle and Means believed that corporate law, in
substance, was a branch of the law of trusts.78 Acknowledging,
however, that this position was more theory than practice Berle and
Means stated:
"In fact, if not in law, at the moment we are thrown back on the
obvious conclusion that a shareholder's right lies in the expectation of
fair dealing rather than the ability to enforce a series of supposed legal
claims.'
79
The cases analyzed by Berle and Means are the precursors of
the business judgment rule.' The chancellor in Bodell v. General
Gas and Electric Corporation8 held that while not "trustees in
the strict sense of the term, yet for convenience [directors] have
been described as such."82 Since then, directors have stood in the
position of fiduciaries.
The business judgment rule is a standard of proof. The rule
creates a presumption that the board of directors acted in good faith
and in furtherance of the best interests of the corporation after
77. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 248 (1932)
(emphasis added).
78. Id. at 275. See also Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931).
79. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 77, at 276.
80. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 661-663 (1983) (summarizing the business judgment rule). See also Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIO ST. U. 615 (1984).
81. 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926).
82. d. at 129, 132 A. at 446.
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exercising due care.83 The purpose of the business judgment rule
is to protect directors from continuously having to justify their
decisions made in the ordinary course of business to
shareholders.' This is true even if the decisions turn out to be
wrong, provided the directors acted in good faith and exercised due
care.8 5 Courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of
boards of directors because courts perceive the boards as
possessing skills, information, and judgment not possessed by the
courts. 6
The business judgment rule only protects boards that act in
good faith in accord with their duty of loyalty.87 If the directors
are disinterested, in all probability they will be deemed to have
acted in good faith.88  However, if the directors are not
disinterested and are beneficiaries of the action, they will have
breached their duty of loyalty, and the business judgment rule will
not protect them. 9 If the plaintiff is able to establish that the
board did not act in good faith or breached its duty of due care, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant directors to show that the
transaction was entirely or intrinsically fair.'
83. See, e.g., Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764 (Del. Ch. 1988).
84. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp 458, 473 (D. Del. 1988).
85. Mathes v. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. 166,175, 190 A.2d 524,529 (1963), rev'd on other grounds,
41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
86. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31,393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
926 (1979); Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 93,608,
97,722 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
87. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62, at 661 (discussing business judgment rule).
88. Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (1960).
89. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979), on remand, 477
F.Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (1960); Puma v.
Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del Ch. 1971) (directors found to be disinterested). See also, e.g.,Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,683 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (directors found to be interested).
90. "[The] plaintiff... must be able to make specific allegations of malfeasance or bad faith.
Where an improper motive is claimed, plaintiff must allege that it was the sole or primary reason for
the directors' actions." Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 3d 767, 777, 230 Cal. Rptr. 815,
820 (1986). "At a minimum, the Delaware cases require that the plaintiff must show some sort of
bad faith on the part of the defendant." Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). "Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a director had an interest in
the transaction at issue, the burden shifts to the director to prove that the transaction was fair and
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In the case of charitable contributions, it is fair to say that the
directors are beneficiaries of the action and have breached their
duties of loyalty to the corporation. Corporate decisions ultimately
come down to the decision of relatively few individuals. Such
decisions are based on the knowledge, biases, and preferences of
the decision-maker. Directors do not make charitable contributions
to organizations of which they do not approve or do not have some
contact." A director might well be an alumnus, trustee or director
of the university or may be a volunteer worker for the charitable
organization. The director may be connected with a research area
because of some malady or disease contracted by a family member.
At the very least, a director benefits from the prestige, notoriety,
ego boost, and acclaim that accompanies charitable gifts--the very
perquisites that accompany non-profit maximization.' Under these
circumstances, the business judgment rule should not protect the
directors, who must show the intrinsic fairness of giving away
corporate assets. The corporation or the shareholders by a
shareholder derivative suit should seek rescission or restitution
from the directors. Rescission puts the parties back where they
were so that no section 170 deduction is allowable to any party. If
restitution were ordered, the director should be entitled, within the
statutory limits, to a section 170 individual deduction for the
amounts actually repaid. The corporation would not be entitled to
a section 170 deduction. If the restitution is for less than the full
amount, the corporation should be entitled to a section 165 loss
deduction for unrecoverable amounts, but not a section 170
deduction.
reasonable to the corporation." Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp, 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. For example, gifts to universities are often made because an officer or director is an
alumnus. Corporate donors are reluctant to give money to environmental law or research groups
because they do not want those same groups later picketing the corporate offices. Wall St. J.
(Midwest ed.), July 11, 1990, at B6, col.3.
92. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
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D. Social Responsibility and Third Party Beneficiaries
The internal relationships between officer, shareholder, and
corporation are governed by the law of agency, the fiduciary
concept including the business judgment rule, and state corporation
laws.93 Now courts are considering the relationship between the
corporation and society. The theory of corporate social
responsibility is developing in the wake of environmental concerns,
product safety, and social justice.
A corporation is private property owned by the shareholders
and operated for their benefit.' The traditional or classical view
of corporate social responsibility95 is that corporations are to make
profits for their shareholders.' Nonetheless, there always has been
some constraint on the means, but no constraint on the goal. The
profit motive remains the ultimate legal purpose for which persons
form corporations.
At common law, it is a tenet of sovereignty that a government
may regulate the manner in which citizens use their own private
property, when necessary for the common good." As the Supreme
Court of the United States once stated:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community
at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
93. See supra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
94. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
95. See Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance--Two Models of the
Corporation, 17 CRFIGHTON L. Rnv. 1 (1983); Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. Ruv. 1 (1979); Epstein, Societa4 Manageria and Legal Perspectives on
Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979); Hetherington,
Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 ST N. L.
RFV. 248 (1969); Mangrum, In Search of a Paradigm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 17
CREIGHTON L. REV. 21 (1983); Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal
and Economic Context of a Continuing Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 114 (1984); Solomon &
Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Modelfor the Corporate Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CoRP.
L. 331 (1987) (discussing theoretical aspects of corporate social responsibility).
96. Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). Also see M.
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-136 (1962) (providing a good discussion of directors
responsibility to make profits for their shareholders).
97. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (stating the common law position).
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the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He
may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he
maintains the use, he must submit to the control. 93
More recent case law requires that corporate directors
recognize that there are other interests to be considered aside from
the interests of shareholders. A watershed in the case law regarding
corporate social responsibility was reached in A. P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow," in 1953. A. P. Smith
Manufacturing Company had regularly contributed to the local
community chest and occasionally to Upsala College."° In 1951,
the board of directors adopted a resolution to contribute to the
Annual Giving to Princeton University.'' The justification was
the usual sound investment, business purpose rhetoric."°  The
court, picking up the thread of the common law as articulated in
Munn v. Illinois, carried the common law further, stating: "It
seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when corporations
were originally created required that they serve public as well as
private interests, modem conditions require that corporations
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities
as members of the communities within which they operate.'
0 3
Significantly, the court held that not only that the gift had been
made in the reasonable belief that it would advance the interests of
the corporation, but the court added that the gift would aid the
public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a part of
the community in which the gift operates."° This was an
extension of the common law." Corporations were authorized to
further social welfare. Still, the court was careful to say that the
98. Id. at 126.
99. 13 NJ. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
100. A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co., 98 A.2d at 582.
101. Id.
102. Id at 583
103. Id. at 586.
104. Id. at 590.
105. Id
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charity in question was not a pet charity of the directors in
furtherance of personal, rather than corporate, ends."°
Even assuming corporations have social responsibilities, there
is no agreement as to what the responsibilities are or who should
decide. One approach is to adopt a moral minimum. A moral
minimum is a negative injunction not to do harm, rather than an
imposition of affirmative duties." A moral minimum is not
entirely satisfactory from the viewpoint of the more liberal
advocates of corporate social responsibility 1"a because a moral
minimum imposes no duty to act, however egregious the
circumstances."° The affirmative duty advocates justify their
position on the proposition that social power gives rise to social
responsibility."' These advocates argue that corporations as
depositories of social power must share the same kinds of
citizenship costs that individuals bear."' This view ignores the
moral agency problem."2 Citizenship is an individual attribute and
involves individual freedom of choice. Corporate social
responsibility is meaningless in terms of moral agency."' Because
a corporation is a nonhuman, artificial entity, it can not have
106. Id.
107. See J. SIMON, C. POWERS, AND J. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1972) (discussing the moral minimum).
108. There is no one accepted view of corporate social responsibility. "By the mid-1970's
managers, business scholars and policymakers finally acknowledged what now appears to be obvious-
-that no single, comprehensive, and universally applicable definition of corporate social responsibility
is possible." Epstein, Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of Corporate Governance,
25 AM. Bus. W. 361, 374 (1987).
109. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing moral minimum).
110. See generally Davis, Five Propositions for Social Responsibility, 18 Bus. HORIZONS 19
(1975) (discussing the affirmative duty position with a rationale for the position).
111. ld
112. See infra text accompanying notes 120-43.
113. See, e.g., T. DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982); P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French
Way, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION (H. Carter ed. 1986); French, The
Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. QuAR. 207 (1979); Goodpastor, The Concept of
Corporate Responsibility in JUST BUSINESS (T. Regan ed. 1983); Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of
Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 THE MONIST 488 (1970); Ladd, Persons and Responsibility:
Ethical Concepts and Impertinent Analogies in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION (H.
Carter ed. 1986) (discussing philosophical aspects of moral agency).
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integrity and, hence, can not be held morally responsible as a
citizen.
There are other dangers in corporate social responsibility.
114
Social welfare has been the prerogative of government. The
government decides what is socially desirable for the benefit of all
the people. Corporate social responsibility shifts the decision from
the government to the corporation--in other words, to the corporate
directors and officers who are not accountable to the public nor
even to the shareholders115 except by virtue of being able to elect
new directors."6 However, proxy fights are rarely won by
outsiders."7  Incumbent corporate directors are almost as
entrenched as members- of Congress. As a matter of public policy,
social welfare decisions should not be made in corporate board
rooms. The allocation of limited resources is critical. The optimum
allocation of resources is best left to society, not business. The
functions of business and government must be kept separate, since
the sole reason for the corporation's existence is to make a profit.
The debate on corporate social responsibility goes far beyond
the bounds of charity. Within the context of section 170, the
government has put limits on the types of organizations which may
receive charitable contributions."8 However, altruism, self-denial,
and charity are human characteristics best left to individual
conscience, outside the collectiveness of the corporate boardroom.
Corporate social responsibility should be limited to the moral
minimum: to do no unnecessary harm while making a profit.
Corporate social responsibility does not imply that the directors and
officers are excused from maximizing profits, but only imposes
114. "Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as
the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money
for their stockholders as possible." M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 133.
115. See P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SocIETY: THE SCOPE OF
CORPORATE POWER 11 (1975) (stating "Shareholders have become investors in corporate equity
securities. They are no longer in a position to act as owners in the traditional sense .... ").
116. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 133-136 and T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social
Responsibility, HARVARD Bus. REv. 41-50 (Sept.-Oct. 1958) (stating the dangers of unaccountability
of directors).
117. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE CORPORATE GIANT 81
(1976) (describing the futility of proxy fights).
118. See supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text.
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limits on the means by which profits are maximized."9 Corporate
social responsibility does not alter the goal of profit maximization.
Corporations have no affirmative duty to be charitable.
E. Moral Agency
There are fundamental differences between individuals and
corporations. Corporations are creatures of the state, created for
profit, with authority to operate only within the parameters set forth
in state law.' ° Corporate decision-making is therefore limited.
Individuals are endowed with freedom of choice and "owe their
existence to a higher sovereign."'2 Professor Jeffrey Nesteruk
analyzed and compared the decision-making process of individuals
and corporations by examining the corporate analogues of
individual reason and desire in the corporate context." Professor
Nesteruk equates desire with profit seeking shareholders, and
equates reason with corporate management charged with making
the daily corporate decisions," concluding that the corporate
decision-making process distorts the dynamics of individual moral
119. A classic example is cigarette advertising, which appeals to targeted groups such as young
people and women, but which simultaneously downplays the health hazard associated with cigarette
smoking.
120. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62, at 41.
121. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
122. Professor Nesteruk describes the roles of desire and reason in individuals as follows:
All individuals experience tensions at least at times, between what they want
to do and what they ought to do. This tension may be expressed as a conflict
between reason and desire. Desire is the motivational, wanting aspect of the
psyche, while reason is the evaluating aspect, the setter of standards. To do
what is right entails using reason to evaluate either conflicting desires or
conflicts between desires and some standard of proper behavior. For while
each desire has as its aim some end-it can only want such an end-not
evaluate its worthiness. The evaluation of competing ends is reason's role.
Nesteruk, Bellotti And the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1989 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 683,
690-91.
123. Id. at 691.
243
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
choice."ss This conclusion leads Professor Nesteruk to the further
conclusion, of importance here, that corporations are not moral
agents."a
A moral agent is an entity capable of making a moral choice
based on a concept of right and wrong. This issue is important
because the value of the first amendment speech and religious
freedoms as well as of other individual rights and freedoms is
premised on the concept of moral agency.' 6 To have a religious
belief presumes the ability to embrace moral choice. Other
individual freedom of choice matters such as who or what
charitable organization is the most worthy of receiving charitable
contributions, what is the best allocation of resources, which is the
most pleasing or aesthetic work of art,'27 what direction should
science take, which scientific projects should be supported, what
constitutes good citizenship, how should society be structured, and
124. Id The distortion is caused by the separation of ownership and control in the modem
corporation which results in the lack of an intimate and interactive relationship between the two
corporate analogues of reason and desire-management and shareholders-whereas in a natural person
reason and desire are united and reason's evaluation of the ends of desire is an act of self-
determination. Ld. at 696-99. Professor Nesteruk describes two distortions--the distortion of displaced
reason and the distortion of unrestrained desire. l The distortion of displaced reason is the result
of the corporate analogue of reason-management-usurping the function of desire by not having to
respond to the multiple personal ends of the individual shareholders who do not meaningfully
participate in modem corporate decision-making. Id The second distortion--the distortion of
unrestrained desire-also is caused by the separation of control from ownership in the modem
corporation d. lThe shareholder desire for profit is a controlling end for management which only may
choose among means to that end rather than among competing ends. 1L The dynamic of the moral
agent is then reversed because desire determines the legitimacy of reason's actions rather than reason
evaluating desire. Id.
125. Id. at 701.
126. James Madison wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.
This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable; because the
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men.
2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), as reproduced in the Appendix to the
dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947).
127. This issue is at the heart of the controversy over the National Endowment of the Arts
funding for exhibitions of works of art some consider obscene. There is a moral choice being
exercised here.
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how our children should be educated all involve moral choice, and
all require the ability to make moral choices. Corporations, being
mere creatures of the state, must operate within the parameters of
state corporation law and are, therefore, incapable of making
decisions based on moral considerations. They are constrained by
the framework of the profit motive.
The landmark case in this area is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.'
In Dodge, the court addressed whether a corporation organized for
profit could divert its profits from the shareholders to society-at-
large. The court drew a distinction between incidental humanitarian
expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of employees and a
general purpose plan to benefit humankind.29  The court
unequivocally stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes .... [I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board
of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose
of benefiting others .... 30
This statement is in effect a reflection of the underlying moral
agency issue. Corporations are restricted to deciding the means to
the end, because what the end is to be is decided by the state.
More recent cases tend toward a social responsibility theory for
corporations.' Nonetheless, the profit motive remains the driving
force behind corporate existence, and social responsibility is
constrained by reasonableness." The reasonableness test,
128. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
129. Id. at 506-507, 170 N.W. at 684.
130. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
131. See, e.g., Theodore Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969) (adopting
a social responsibility theory).
132. "Mhe test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift such as the one here in issue
is that of reasonableness . I...-'d. at 405.
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however, should be applied within the framework of moral agency,
because what is "reasonable" is a value judgment. Corporations
should be prohibited from making decisions involving individual
freedom of conscience because they do not have an "intellect" or
"mind,"' ' and are, therefore, incapable of exercising individual
freedom of conscience. It would be unreasonable to expect or allow
a corporation to make a decision which ordinarily involves the
exercise of individual freedom of conscience.
Making a charitable contribution to a religious organization is
an exercise of the individual freedom of conscience. Giving to a
religious organization is predicated on a belief in certain religious
tenets and dogma, and their propagation. Corporations, not being
moral agents, cannot make value judgments, have religious beliefs,
or worship. To allow corporations to make charitable contributions
to religious organizations undermines the concept of individual
conscience which is at the base of religious belief. Making choices
involving civic organizations and citizenship requires a belief in a
particular political philosophy and form of government. Educational
choices require a subscription to a philosophy of public and private
education. Scientific choices require a formulation of the role of
science in society. All of these choices and more are beyond the
capabilities of corporations.
Economic studies of corporate charitable giving confirm that
corporations do not exercise any moral choice in making charitable
contributions. The studies show that the corporate tax has a price
and net-income effect on corporate giving." Corporate charitable
contributions are proportional to after tax income,"' and
corporations tend to make charitable contributions when doing so
has a positive effect on after tax profits." In a study of corporate
contributions during the period between 1936 and 1961, Professor
133. Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public UtIL Comm'n of
California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) makes this point by stating: "To ascribe to such artificial entities an
'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality." Pacfic
Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Orace Johnson established that only in years of high marginal tax
rates on excess profits had corporate giving approached the former
five percent 37 statutory limit, and that corporate giving dropped
precipitously in the years for which the excess profits tax was
removed.38 Corporate giving is bottom line oriented. Moreover,
the amount of corporate giving seems to be related to the
competitive position of the firm in the industry.
In Adam Smith's ideal world of pure competition, no corporate
giving would be tolerated since to make a charitable contribution
is to raise the cost of goods and price oneself out of the market." 9
Monopolists, at the other extreme, have no incentive to make
charitable contributions if they are profit maximizers. The only
corporations with an incentive to make charitable contributions are
the so-called "rival" firms. The rival firms are corporations that
are oligopolistic'"  or imperfectly or monopolistically
competitive, 4' which seek a comparative advantage over each
other by such means as contributions, public relations, advertising,
and innovative marketing and management. 2 Professor Johnson
has established that these predictions are true. 3  Corporate
charitable giving, consistent with corporate status, is motivated by
profits.
The profit motive is diametrically opposed to the values
underlying individual freedom of choice. The choice is between
what is right and wrong, not between what is profitable or not.
Corporations distort the whole concept of social welfare. The
137. The corporate limit is currently 10%. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (West 1990).
138. Johnson, Corporate Philanthropy:AnAnalysis of Corporate Contributions, 39 J. Bus.489,
492 (1966).
139. Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical
Perspective, 62 TEX. L. R. 1263, 1268 (1984) (discussing Adam Smith's theory).
140. An oligopoly is a market where there are only a few competing producers, forcing each
producer to take into account what each other producer does. See B. T. ALLEN, MANAGERIAL
ECONOMICS 117 (1988) (discussion of an oligopoly).
141. Monopolistic competition is the result of having many sellers of only slightly differentiated
products, but not enough sellers to make the market purely competitive. See id. at 116-17 (discussion
of a monopolistic corporation).
142. Johnson, supra note 138, at 497.
143. Id. at 496-98.
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myopia can be cured by repealing the section 170 deduction for
charitable contributions made by corporations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The existence of the section 170 deduction for corporations
conflicts with the basic laws and rationales of agency and trusts as
they have been applied in the corporate context. When analyzed in
economic terms, the section 170 deduction for corporations results
in a misallocation of scarce resources and a distortion of social
welfare. Charitable giving by corporations is not consistent with
moral agency, nor is it required by corporate social responsibility.
Repeal of section 170 with respect to corporate charitable
contribution deductions would effectively stop corporate charitable
giving, whether authorized by state statute or justified on the basis
of corporate social responsibility, because corporate giving is
bottom line oriented. In the absence of a tax deduction,
corporations would have no incentive to give corporate assets to
charity. Some limited corporate giving might still be justified as
ordinary and necessary business expenses and, hence, would be
deductible under section 162; however, if section 170 were
repealed the courts would scrutinize such expenditures more
carefully. By eliminating deductibility except under section 162,
managers are forced to consider profit maximization and business
purpose rather than charity qud charity.
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